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C. JON HANDY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Y. E. GORDON 
et al., Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Vendor and Purchaser - Contracts - Terms - Subordination 
Clause: Security for Payment.-Although the parties to a con-
tract of sale containing a subordination clause may delegate 
to the vendee or third party lenders power· to determine the 
details of subordinating loans, an enforceable subordination 
clause must contain tenns (such as limiting the use to which 
the proceeds may be put and limiting the loans so that they 
do not exceed the contemplated value of the improvements they 
finance) that will define and minimize the r~sk that the subordi-
nating liens will impair or destroy the seller's security. 
[2] Specific Performance-Fairness of Agreement: Realty-Where 
Personal Liability the Only Protection.-Even assuming that a 
contract of sale contemplating subdivision by the vendee is 
sufficiently different from the usual land sale contract to take 
it out of the operation of the anti-deficiency legislation (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 580b), the personal liability alone of the vendee 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 22, 192; 
[2, 3] Specific Performance, §§ 38, 43. 
*Reporter 's Note: Amendment ndopted November 8, 1966. 
2The defendant's testimony Wl18 riddled with internal inconsistencies 
and incongruities. It was inconsistent with the severaJ conflicting ac-
counts he gave to the police after Leing advised of his constitutional 
rights. It was inconsistent with other ~alient evidence established apart 
from his testimony and his extrajudicial statements: the curious fact 
thnt the gun he used and the car in which he rode, purportedly to collect 
a debt, were both stolen; the sinii:!ter fact that before he arrived at the 
house there was a telephone call in an obvious effort to determine 
whether anyone was in the Anderson home and the caller hung up without 
identifying himself when Locklear answered the call; the chilling fact 
that the defendant's car moved slowly down the street "stopping and 
checking" while Locklear hid in the bushes after his 1light from the 
house. 
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would not, under Civ. Code, § 3391, subd. 2, constitute sufficient 
protection to the vendor to permit specific performance. _ 
[8] Id.-Fairness of Agreement: Realty--Where Personal Lia-
bility the Only Protection.-A contract of sale of realty was 
not "just and reasonable" to the vendor and could not be 
enforced under Civ. Code, § 3391, where, because of inadequate 
terms as to subordina ting construction and refinancing loans 
and the absence of restrictions on the purchaser's use of them, 
and because the vendors did not receive a downpayment that 
would effectively cushion their position, and the first payment 
of principal was deferred witil three years after the close of 
escrow, the contract left the vendors with nothing but the pur-
chaser's good faith and business judgment to insure them that 
they would ever receive anything for conveying their land. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Carlos M. Teran, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to compel specific performance of a contract of sale 
of real property. Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
William L. Stein for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
I Reily & Blase, Edward L. Lascher and William C. Hoelsken 
for Defendants and Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for 
defendants entered after the trial court granted a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff contends that his com-
plaint states a cause of action for specific performance of a 
contract to sell land and that therefore the trial court erred 
in granting the defendants' motion. (See MacIsaac v. Pozzo 
(1945) 26 Ca1.2d 809, 815-816 [161 P.2d 449].) 
The complaint alleges that on January 21, 1964, the parties 
entered into a written contract in which defendants agreed 
to sell certain real property to plaintiff. The contract was set 
forth in escrow instructions that described the property as 
approximately 320 acres known as the Gordon Ranch and ex-
cepted about three acres that included thc sellers' home. The 
purchase price was $1,500,100. The instructions stated that 
$300,000 was paid to the sellers outside of escrow and that 
an additional $100 was deposited with the escrow company. 
The buyer agreed to execute a note secured by a deed of trust 
for the balance of $1:200,000 plus interest of 2 percent per 
year. The note was to be paid in annual installments of 
[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Specific Performance, § 22; Am.Jur., Specific 
Performance (1st ed § 92). 
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$120:000 or more beginning three years after the close of the 
escrow, and any unpaid balance was to become due 10 years 
after the escrow closed. The sellers agreed to subordinate their 
trust deed to other trust deeds securing loans to be obtained 
by the buyer for construction and permanent financing. 
The buyer was given the right to obtain a zoning modifica-
tion and to withdraw from the contract if he did not approve 
geological, engineering, and zoning reports. At the close of 
the eScrow the legal description was to be approved by the 
parties and was to show title vested in plaintiff C. Jon Handy 
or nominee. 
The complaint alleged that the recithl of the $300,000 pay-
ment was a sham and was included in the instructions at the 
sellers' request to win a bet. The true consideration was 
$1,200,100, which plaintiff alleged was fair and reasonable 
and was sul>stantially higher than the prices at which com-
parable property in the locality was selling. 
After defendants sought to rescind the contract on April 2, 
1964, plaintiff brought this action for specific performance. 
The court granted the defendants' motion for a judgment on 
the pleadings on the ground that the agreement was too un-
certain to be enforced because the subordination clause lacked 
essential "terms. " 
Plaintiff co;ntends that the trial court erred in holding that 
the subordination clause lacked essential terms. He points out 
that the clause specified that the construction and financing 
loans should be in the maximum amounts of $10,000 and 
$52,000 per lot, should have maximum interest rates of 7 per-
cent and 6.6 percent, and should mature in not more than 
6 and 35 years respectively. Although the contract does not 
specify the number of lots into which the land is to be aivided, 
plaintiff contends that the number of lots was not left to 
future agreement of the parties but was properly left to his 
discretion as the developer of the contemplated subdivision. 
No problem of indefiniteness is presented under plaintiff's 
view of the contract. It sets forth all the terms defendants 
deemed essential to protect their interests and leaves to the 
business judgment and good faith of plaintiff the working out 
with lenders, builders, and home buyers of the details to make 
the venture a success. 
Defendants contend that whether or not the trial court 
erred in finding that the contract is too indefinite to enforce, 
its ruling must be sustained on the ground that it appears 
from the complaint as a matter of law that the contract "is 
l 
! 
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not, as to [them], just and reasonable." (Civ. Code, § 3391, 
subd. 2.) We agree with defendants' contention. 
[1] Although the parties to a contract of sale containing 
a subordination clause may delegate to the vendee or third 
party lenders power to determine the details of subordinating 
loans, an enforceable subordination clause must contain terms 
that will define and minimize the risk that the subordinating 
liens will impair or destroy the seller's security. (Stockwell v. 
Lindeman, 229 Cal.App.2d 750, 758 [40 Cal.Rptr. 555]; 
Magna Development Co. v. Reed, 228 CaI.App.2d" 230, 236 [39 
Cal.Rptr. 284] ; Burrow v. Timmsen, 223 Cal.App.2d 283, 289-
290 [35 Cal.Rptr. 668, 100 .A.L.R.2d 544] ; Roven v. Miller, 
168 Cal . .App.2d 391, 398 [335 P .2d 1035].) Such terms may 
include limits on the use to which the proceeds may be put 
to insure that their use will improve the value of the land, 
maximum amounts so that the loans will not exceed the con-
templated value of the improvements they finance, require-
ments that the loans do not exceed some specified percentage 
of the construction cost or value of the property as improved, 
specified amounts per square foot of construction, or other 
limits designed to protect the security. Without some such 
terms, however, the seller is forced to rely entirely on the 
buyer's good faith and ability as a developer to insure that he 
will not lose both his land and the purchase price. [2] Even 
if we were to assume that a contract of sale contemplating 
subdivision by the vendee is sufficiently different from the 
usual land sale contract to take it out of the operation of the 
anti-deficiency legislation (Code Civ. Proc., § 580b; see Het-
land, Real Property, 53 Cal.L.Rev. 151, 161-162), the personal 
liability alone of the vendee would not constitute sufficient 
protection to the vendor to permit specific performance. ( Civ. 
Code, § 3391, subd. 2; Klein v. Markarian, 175 Cal. 37, 41 
[165 P. 3] ; Quan v. Kraseman, 84 Cal.App.2d 550, 551 [191 
P.2d 16] ; see Rest., Contracts, § 373.) 
[3] The contract alleged in the complaint does not afford 
defendants any additional protection.1 Although the proceeds 
lIt should be noted that in this case we are dealing simply with a eon-
tract for the sale of real property and the rights and duties llowing there-
from. Plaintiff has not alleged that the eon tract was made pursuant to 
any understanding between the parties that might give rise to enforceable 
fiduciary duties that would afford defendants protection that the contract 
itself does not. There can be no doubt that through appropriate agency, 
partnership, or corporate arrangements one person may delegate to an-
other broad powers over the economic development of his assets. Such 
economic-legal arrangements have their own rules to protect the interests 
of the parties thereto, and by concluding that the contract in this ease is 
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of the subordinating loans are to be used primarily for con-
struction and refinancing, any funds that are not needed for 
these purposes may be disbursed to plaintiff. The absence of 
restrictions on plaintiff's use of these funds leaves defendants 
without assurance that all of the proceeds of the loans will 
be used to improve the land that represents their security. 
Because the limits on the loans are expressed as absolutes, they 
provide no assurance that the amounts of the loans will not 
exceed the value the improvements add to the security. More-
over, the limits are maximums per lot, and plaintiff has un-
restricted discretion in determining the size of each lot. Thus 
defendants are not assured that the total amount of the sub-
ordinating loans will be kept low enough to enable them to 
protect themselves by bidding on the property if the senior 
liens are foreclosed.2 Finally defendants did not receive a 
downpaymeJlt that would effectively cushion their position, 
and the first payment of principal is deferred until three 
years after the close of escrow. 
Thus, the contract leaves defendants with nothing but plain-_ 
tiff's good faith and business judgment to insure them that 
they will ever receive anything for conveying their land. Such 
a contract is not as to them "just and reasonable" within the 
meaning ·of: Civil Code section 3391. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
not a just and reasonable resolution of the parties' objectives, we intend 
to cast no doubt on the validity of other business arrangements pursuant 
to which broad powers may be delegated. 
2If the property is divided into one-acre lots, the subordinating eon-
struction and financing loans could total .3,200,000 and .16,640,000 
respectively. If %-acre lots are chosen, the loans could total $12,800,000 
and $66,560,000. 
